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Abstract: This paper investigates structural change in family farming in ten EU New Member States 
from Central and Eastern Europe which can be treated as a borderline between transition and de-
veloped economies. The paper proposes that farms using at least one Annual Work Unit (AWU) 
family labour are classified as family since it is considered that engaging less than one full-time 
family member may not show commitment to the family operation. The Oaxaca-Blinder decompo-
sition is employed to analyse the drivers of structural change at a farm level, i.e., the extent to which 
it is technology or endowment driven. To compare the developments in different countries, the 
changes are presented in relative terms in order to reveal the relative distance travelled by the struc-
tural change in individual New Member States alongside the relative importance of technology and 
endowments changes. The estimation of a translog production function by country is used to derive 
the corresponding decompositions. Empirical analysis is based on data from the EU Farm Account-
ancy Data Network (FADN) for two time points—2007, when the last of the ten CEECs joined the 
EU—Bulgaria and Romania, and 2015 to investigate structural change during the first decade of EU 
membership. The results show that the differences in the initial conditions and the adjustments to 
the CAP have brought about quite a diverse picture concerning the changes in output in the family 
and non-family farms in the NMS. The a priori expected dynamics of positive output growth in 
family farms and negative in the non-family has only materialised in Latvia, Romania and Slovakia. 
The decomposition of output changes suggests a positive effect of technical change in family farms 
only in the early years of EU accession. Concerning endowments, their effect on structural change 
is mostly positive with the only exception of Slovenia. This suggests that the family farming sector 
grows by accumulating productive resources. However, this growth has not always materialised in 
increase of family farms output. 
Keywords: structural change; family farms; EU New Member States; technological change; endow-
ment; Oaxaca-Blinder technique 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates structural change in family farming in ten EU New Member 
States (NMS), which can be treated as a borderline between transition and developed 
economies, i.e., Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. The objective is to examine to what extent structural change is 
technology or endowments driven. 
Structural change can be defined as the process of “recombining and redeploying the 
resources used in agriculture” [1]. Changes in the mix of land, labour, and capital used in 
farm production, in parallel with the application of new technologies and equipment, usu-
ally lead to an increase of competitiveness and efficiency of the agricultural sector. From 
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this point of view, structural change is a positive and politically desired development. At 
the farm level, structural change is most often linked to the capital and mechanisation of 
farm operations, increased use of purchased inputs, and greater farm specialisation. 
Usually, one of the factors that affects structural change is public policy [2]. There is 
a natural experiment that, with their accession to the EU, all Central and East European 
countries (CEECs) moved to the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Although there 
are some modalities in the CAP implementation, the main CAP measures including mar-
ket regulations and decoupled income support to farmers are common. The CAP support, 
particularly direct income payments, represents a secure stream of income and facilitate 
farmers’ access to credit since borrowers can offer a greater repayment capacity and this 
helps farm investment. The response to policy support has been heterogeneous. Some 
farmers managed to take advantage of policy transfers, and their businesses experienced 
accelerated structural change, while others were lagging behind, experiencing a sluggish 
change or were unable to face the competitive pressure in the EU Single Market and exited 
the sector. 
In view of the above, the paper focuses on a comparative picture of structural change 
in family farming in different EU NMS assuming almost common policy environment 
post-accession to the EU. However, it should be noted that the EU membership and the 
adoption of the CAP have had different consequences for structural change in different 
countries. The consequences were influenced by the pre-accession farm structures, land 
tenure system and the pre-accession support to agriculture, which in turn were influenced 
by past developments, i.e., the initial conditions before the start of the economic reforms 
in late 1980s and early 1990s, and the politically chosen path of these reforms. 
We focus specifically on family farms since structural change is central for family 
farming as it is a factor that helps offset certain disadvantages of family farms in respect 
to economic efficiency, access to farming resources, such as land and capital, and access 
to markets, particularly in terms of bargaining power in the food chain. Since they co-exist 
with non-family types of organisation of agricultural production, family farms need to 
compete not only in terms of efficiency (scale, productivity) but also in terms of innovation 
and entrepreneurship, and, from this point of view, the uptake of new technologies and 
the weight of technology in structural change is a central issue [3]. 
Family farming covers a wide range of farm types and sizes, with both full- and part-
time farmers, and farmers with and without other gainful activities. The objectives of 
some family farms are focused on commercial farm business operations, while others pro-
duce mainly to satisfy household food needs, the so-called semi-subsistence farms, and a 
third group includes “lifestyle” (often called “hobby”) farms, belonging to families with 
substantial non-agricultural income. 
Family farm and family farmer may be defined in several ways. Definitions can be 
based on share of family labour, on ownership and control (and, thus, succession between 
generations), on legal status (sole holders), or on who bears the business risk. The ap-
proach in this paper is based on labour input, i.e., those farms that use at least one Annual 
Work Unit (AWU) family labour are defined as family. It is considered that engaging less 
than one full-time family member may not show commitment to the family operation and, 
hence, such farms may either fall into the category of non-family businesses based mainly 
on hired labour, or may generate utility as hobby farms contributing very little to house-
hold incomes. Our proposed threshold is lower compared to the some used, i.e., of up to 
2 AWUs [4]. It should be noted that this higher threshold implicitly focused on West Eu-
ropean agriculture, while, in many CEECs, such a definition would exclude a large pro-
portion of smaller family farms. 
Empirical analysis is based on data from the EU Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN). The basic FADN sampling unit is the commercial holding, i.e., “a farm which is 
large enough to provide a main activity for the farmer and a level of income sufficient to 
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support his or her family” [5]. Data availability for each country is from the year of acces-
sion to the EU of the last two—Bulgaria and Romania, i.e., 2007, and annual comparable 
datasets for all countries were available to the authors for the period to 2015 including. 
In order to analyse the causes of structural change, i.e., the extent to which the struc-
tural change is technology or endowment driven (or driven by interaction of these two), 
the analysis employs Oaxaca-Blinder technique [6,7]. To compare developments in differ-
ent countries, the changes are presented in relative terms in order to reveal the relative 
distance travelled by the structural change in individual countries alongside the relative 
importance of technology and endowment changes. The estimation of a translog produc-
tion function by country for all family farms in the FADN database, as defined in the pa-
per, is used to derive the corresponding decompositions. 
2. Background to Structural Change in CEECs 
In the last three decades, one of the main drivers of changes in the farm structures 
and output in NMSs from Central and Eastern Europe were the market reforms across all 
economic sectors taking place at the same time as major political reforms in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Important factors affecting structural change in agriculture were institu-
tional reforms, which reinstated private property rights in land and privatised non-land 
farm assets. 
A conceptual model to investigate structural change in the ten CEECs which joined 
the European Union (EU) in the 2000s indicates two areas which we assume to influence 
directly or indirectly the structural change in family farming: the past development, i.e., 
the initial conditions at the start of the market reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
and the measures and speed of national policy reforms [8]. Both affect the way individual 
countries have adjusted to the implementation of the EU CAP post-accession. The imple-
mentation of the CAP and the longer-term effects of the initial conditions, i.e., whether 
agriculture was mainly collectivised pre-reform, as in e.g., Bulgaria, Czechia, and Slo-
vakia, or was organised in predominantly small private farms, e.g., in Poland and Slove-
nia, are factors that have influenced the speed and depth of structural change of family 
farms in individual CEECs. 
In respect to the initial conditions, at the start of the reform process, the main debate 
focused on macroeconomic reforms. Experts argued that at the centre of this debate lied 
the fourfold problem of deciding the speed of implementation of institutional changes, 
the sequence of reforms in the various economic sectors, their relation to management 
measures and the depth of the reforms themselves [9]. Overwhelmingly, a sharp decline 
in output was observed in the first years of transition. Two theoretical explanations were 
put forward for the decline in output which are relevant to agriculture. Some models ex-
plained the sharp decline by sector-specific capital that could not be turned to alternative 
uses and the necessary time to build new capital [10]. Agriculture is one of the sectors with 
highly specific and largely immobile capital (e.g., agricultural land). The second theoreti-
cal explanation was based on the imperfections in the credit market. In agriculture, they 
hindered the access of state and collective farms, which at the beginning of transition were 
the main producers in most of the CEECs, to capital necessary to maintain the level of 
production and this brought about a sharp decline of output. 
The general macroeconomic reforms have strongly affected agriculture [11]. Apart 
from this, several sectoral reform processes were central to the development of the farm 
economy, including agricultural price liberalisation and terms of trade development 
against agriculture, land reforms, farm restructuring, and liberalisation of labour market 
resulting in deep adjustments of farm labour. It should be noted that these reforms devel-
oped in parallel and have been interdependent. For example, land restitution brought 
about farm restructuring with a gradual decrease in the size of state and collective farms, 
and development of family farms, many of which were semi-subsistence. 
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The characteristics of national agricultural post-communist reforms which affected 
the size and proliferation of family farms, and their structural change analysed in this 
paper, are in Table 1. 
Table 1. Implications of post-communist land reforms for family farms in CEECs. 
Countries Characteristics of Land Reform 
Outcome for Farm Struc-
tures 
Bulgaria 
Restitution of land rights as they were 
in 1946; privatisation of state land 
through tenders 
Small family farms; co-
ownership between heirs; 
large corporate farms 
through lease agreements 
with private owners; over-
all result—a dual farm 
structure 
Czechia 
Restitution of land rights to private 
owners or their heirs as they were in 
1948 
Due to fragmented owner-
ship most land was leased 
out by private owners to 
large corporate farms, the 
latter maintained as a pre-
dominant farm structure 
Estonia 
Restitutions of land rights as they were 
in the 1940s before WWII; privatisation 
of state land through sales 
Small farms; more than 
half of utilised agricultural 
area used through lease 
agreements 
Hungary 
Compensation of former owners in-
stead of physical restitution; land dis-
tributed to current users; state land 
sold at auctions in rural areas 
Very mixed structure small 
subsistence farms; me-
dium-sized family farms; 
large corporate farms 
based fully on leased land 
Latvia 
Restitutions of land rights as they were 
in the 1940s before WWII or compen-
sation initially capped at 50 ha and 
later increased to 100 ha; privatisation 
of state land initially to household 
plots 
Small and medium-sized 
family farms; proliferation 
of lease agreements 
Poland 
Did not proceed to restitution and left 
the land to small peasants who culti-
vated it pre-reform; privatisation of 
state land with preference to commer-
cial family farms 
Farm structures vary de-
pending on the region—
very small in south and 
east; medium-sized com-
mercial farms in north and 
west  
Romania 
Liquidation of collective farms; restitu-
tion initially capped at 10 ha/family 
later increased to 30 ha 
A large number of small 
subsistence family farms; 
low number of corporate 
farms; some larger family 
farms and larger farms 
managed by agricultural 
associations  
Slovakia  
Similar to Czechia; new private coop-
eratives continued the activity of col-
lective farms; agricultural policy did 
Due to fragmented owner-
ship structure most land 
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not encourage the break-up of large 
corporate farms 
leased out by private own-
ers to large corporate 
farms; very small family 
farms 
Slovenia  
Small existing owner-operated farms 
maintained; restitution of state land to 
previous owners 
Many relatively small fam-
ily farms 
Source: Based on Reference [12]. 
Over time, the importance of the pre-reform initial conditions has decreased [11], alt-
hough they continued to influence to some degree the situation in agriculture just before 
and during the first years of accession to the EU. 
Before the EU accession, the commentators were unanimous that there was a sub-
stantial gap between the CEECs and the established EU-15 Member States since the former 
were less developed and more agricultural. This was true at the time, but, in the first years 
post-accession, CEECs experienced quick agricultural adjustments (Table 2). 
Table 2. Changes in labour directly employed on the farm, number of sole holder farms, and stand-
ard output. 
Country 



















Bulgaria 78.5 94.7 92.2 80.1 98.8 74.5 76.2 119.5 68.0 
Czechia 93.3 98.8 92.5 69.3 101.1 54.3 109.1 122.1 118.0 
Estonia 83.3 91.7 81.5 69.2 110.8 81.7 77.2 98.8 94.4 
Latvia 75.3 102.7 83.4 81.0 126.5 76.6 97.0 134.0 98.3 
Lithuania 79.6 79.8 91.0 80.7 116.5 86.7 100.3 127.9 85.9 
Hungary 86.4 89.2 87.5 106.1 124.3 91.8 99.6 103.1 85.0 
Poland 100.0 106.1 96.5 83.3 110.4 62.9 101.6 115.9 94.9 
Romania 85.0 95.2 92.3 70.8 89.8 97.8 97.2 114.6 94.1 
Slovenia 88.3 105.6 97.6 90.9 103.8 99.0 109.1 110.6 97.0 
Slovakia 96.1 105.1 100.4 41.1 130.0 33.1 88.9 93.2 93.8 
* The standard output of an agricultural product (crop or livestock) is the average monetary value 
of the agricultural output at farm-gate price, in Euro per hectare or per head of livestock. Source: 
Authors calculations based on Eurostat. 
In general (with a few exceptions), labour input and the number of farms decreased 
and the standard output (SO) increased. Later on, in 2013, in comparison with 2010, labour 
use stabilised or increased with the exception of Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovakia. Initially, 
the main drop in the number of farms was due to the disappearance of the smallest ones 
with land area up to 2 hectares (ha). Two countries with a large number of small farms, 
Bulgaria and Romania, showed different speed of restructuring—a quick disappearance 
of the smallest farms in Bulgaria, but slow in Romania which, in the first years post-acces-
sion, e.g., in 2010, ended up with 2.7 million farms smaller than 2 ha, amounting to 70.8% 
of all farms. The decrease of labour used, increase of standard output, and disappearance 
of the smallest farms boosted labour productivity, measured as standard output per 
AWU, in all countries albeit with a different rate, is given in Table 3. 
Table 3. Standard output per AWU (Euro). 
Country 2005 2007 2010 2013 
Bulgaria 2703 3260 4021 6309 
Czechia 17,623 18,659 27,235 30,491 
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Source: Authors calculations based on Eurostat. 
The competitive pressure in the EU Single Market contributed to the dynamic 
changes in the number and size of farm units, labour, and output. 
Based on the above background, it is important to identify the drivers of the struc-
tural change during the first decade of EU membership and implementation of the CAP, 
i.e., the extent to which it has been technology or endowment driven, and to understand 
the changing dynamics in different countries which may affect their competitiveness 
within the EU. For this purpose, we employ the Oaxaca-Blinder technique [6,7]. 
3. Methodological Approach 
Structural change can be studied at different level of aggregation, and, in this paper, 
a micro approach is taken to analyse structural change at a farm level. The main assump-
tion is that farms are heterogenous; thus, they may react differently to the drivers of struc-
tural change. Often, this heterogeneity is explained with path dependency [13]. 
We apply the most widely used version of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for lin-
ear regression models with a dependent variable y and regressors collected in a design 
matrix X. The representation is as follows (we follow Reference [14], who provides an 
excellent overview of the underlying issues): 
Δ?̄? = 𝑋1̄′𝛽1̂ − 𝑋0̄′𝛽0̂ = (𝑋1̄ − 𝑋0¯ )′𝛽0̂ + 𝑋0̄′(𝛽1̂ − 𝛽0̂) + (𝑋1̄ − 𝑋0̄)′(𝛽1̂ − 𝛽0̂),  
where hats signify estimated quantities (the coefficients), bars show mean values, and the 
subscripts 1 and 0 refer to the corresponding samples. In our case, these are the two time 
points, i.e., 2007 and 2015. In the case of output changes over a given period, the above 
decomposes the difference between the mean output between the two time points (i.e., 
Δ?̄?) as a sum of three distinct components. By explaining the output in each separate time 
point by a different regression function and constructing the difference between these two 
different regressions for each time period (i.e., Δ?̄? = 𝑋1̄′𝛽1̂ − 𝑋0¯ ′𝛽0̂)), the above difference 
is restated as a decomposition into effect of endowment, technological change, and inter-
action of the two. 
More specifically, the first term in this decomposition (𝑋1̄ − 𝑋0̄)′𝛽0̂ is the ‘endow-
ment’ effect. It measures the effect on the final change of output that is due to the change 
in the ‘endowments’, in this case, the available factors of production land, labour, capital, 
and intermediate consumption, i.e., (𝑋1̄ − 𝑋0̄), weighted by the initial relationship, i.e., 
the production technology at the start of the period, represented by the coefficients of the 
production function in the first time point 𝛽0̂. Therefore, the endowment effect measures 
what the output effect of the change in the endowment would have been if the production 
technology was kept constant. 
The second term 𝑋0̄′(𝛽1̂ − 𝛽0̂) is the effect of the coefficients. It represents the effect 
of the change in the regression coefficients between the two time points, i.e., the change 
in the production technology, evaluated at (i.e., weighted by) the initial endowment. Sim-
ilarly to the endowment effect, the interpretation of this one is the output change that 
would have resulted from the technological change (i.e., change in the production func-
tion between the two time points), if endowments themselves did not change. The last 
term is essentially an interaction of endowment and technology changes. 
Estonia 7916 8717 13,946 17,859 
Latvia 3543 4828 7543 10,421 
Lithuania 6241 6250 9021 11,499 
Hungary 6297 6501 7615 7881 
Poland 6555 6961 9227 10,527 
Romania 3425 3840 4870 5740 
Slovenia 8177 9778 11,168 11,330 
Slovakia 5606 6130 19,382 20,329 
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To obtain the above decomposition, one needs to estimate the corresponding regres-
sion coefficients for each time point (i.e., 𝛽1̂ and 𝛽0̂) and then calculate the corresponding 
terms in the decomposition. Since this is a two-step procedure, standard asymptotics do 
not hold, and the relevant sampling distributions of these effects are obtained by boot-
strapping both steps. Here, we have used 10,000 bootstrap replications and calculated the 
approximate bootstrap standard errors. The above procedure was repeated for all ten 
countries. 
4. Data 
We have used the FADN datasets for 2007 and 2015 for all ten countries considered 
in this paper. In order to construct the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, we have employed 
a standard translog production function specification in which the total farm output is 
explained by four production factors, namely capital, labour, land, and intermediate con-
sumption. Hence, the data includes measures of these five variables over the two time 
points (2007 and 2015), which define the period over which the corresponding output 
changes are being investigated. The translog specification is linear in parameters (alt-
hough not in the production inputs); thus, the standard linear regression approach out-
lined above is applicable to the transformed version of the data that includes logarithms 
and logarithmic interactions. 
Concerning the variables, we use the monetary value of farm output in Euro, the 
capital measured as the total value of assets minus the land value in Euro, labour repre-
sented as the total labour input in AWU, land measured in hectares, and the value of in-
termediate consumption in Euro. The latter is included since some farms may produce an 
intermediate product which they do not sell but use as an input for their final output, e.g., 
a farm may grow maize to use as animal feed. Additionally, the family labour (classified 
as unpaid in FADN) in AWU was used to distinguish family farms from the rest of farm 
units and, thus, was not included in the production function specification but used as a 
filter. 
Using nominal monetary values directly for both time points would also reflect in-
flationary pressure; therefore, we deflated the monetary values for 2015 using 2007 as a 
base year for output, capital, and intermediate consumption. A standard way of doing 
this is by dividing the 2015 monetary values by a deflator for the period. In principle, 
agricultural producer price index would have been the most relevant deflator but it was 
not available for the studied countries. For this reason, we used the World Bank GDP 
deflator and aggregated the annual indices over the period to calculate an overall deflator 
for each country. There is an additional consideration to take into account, i.e., that the 
monetary data in FADN is in Euros and changes in the Euro exchange rate to national 
currencies create an effect similar to that of inflation. We have, therefore, additionally de-
flated the monetary values by an exchange rate change index with regard to the 2007 val-
ues similarly to the way we did with the inflation changes. This mainly affects countries 
which did not join the Eurozone—Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Slovenia used 
the Euro throughout the analysed period, while Bulgaria’s currency board effectively 
fixed its national currency against the Euro. The remaining NMS joined the Eurozone at 
different years during the period under investigation. However, since, before joining the 
Euro, they were part of the European exchange rate mechanism, their currencies were 
closely linked to the Euro and could only fluctuate within a small margin. For this reason, 
the European Central Bank reports their reference exchange rates for the period as the one 
they used when joining the Eurozone. Therefore, it was not necessary to introduce ex-
change rate adjustments for these countries. 
Before proceeding to our decomposition results, it would be useful to describe the 
family sector with regard to the rest of agriculture and to present its development over 
the studied period. We first look at the mean values of the output in each country for 
family and non-family farms. This comparison places the family sector within the more 
general farm structure of each country. Due to the focus of this paper on structural change 
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in the family farm sector, family farms are the part of the FADN sample used to estimate 
the relevant decomposition, with the rest of the FADN sample, which includes the non-
family farms (defined in this paper as farms employing less than 1 AWU family labour), 
presented in Table 4 for comparison purposes only. 
Table 4. Comparison of average output changes in family and non-family farms, 2007–2015. 












Bulgaria 18,091 22,568 25% 42,767 67,113 57% 
Czechia 82,259 73,040 −11% 947,453 927,936 −2% 
Estonia 49,447 42,934 −13% 184,031 81,011 −56% 
Hungary 73,971 73,038 −1% 71,902 52,441 −27% 
Lithuania 39,381 45,828 16% 145,415 223,109 53% 
Latvia 43,536 48,360 11% 190,954 143,789 −25% 
Poland 32,920 31,641 −4% 24,930 27,168 9% 
Romania 10,067 14,878 48% 130,070 19,942 −85% 
Slovakia 97,549 119,642 23% 1,023,009 558,929 −45% 
Slovenia 32,388 27,073 −16% 11,109 10,637 −4% 
Source: authors calculation using transformed FADN data. 
Table 4 shows that, with the exception of Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, family 
farms were smaller in terms of output compared to the rest of agriculture. The initial con-
ditions should be taken into account here. As mentioned previously, in Poland and Slo-
venia independent farmers were predominant before the reforms, whilst Hungary has 
started implementing some elements of market economy as early as 1960s. However, in 
Poland, in both time points, and, in Hungary, in 2015, the difference in output between 
the two types of farm organisation was relatively small. However, looking at the under-
lying factors of production, in particular, labour and capital (presented in Appendix A), 
the family farms in Poland and Hungary have been indeed larger than the rest. 
In terms of relative growth of the two types, the picture is more diverse. The output 
of the average family farm has increased in the period 2007–2015, with the exception of 
Czechia, Estonia, and Slovenia. In Poland and Hungary, it contracted, as well, but by a 
very small percentage. However, looking at the non-family category, its output has de-
creased across the board, with the exception of Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Poland. This 
means that, although, in general, the family farms might be smaller than the rest, post-
accession to the EU, and after the implementation of the CAP support, they have started 
closing the gap. 
Romania and Bulgaria experienced a larger increase of family farms output than the 
remaining NMS. It is important to note a qualitative difference between Bulgaria and Ro-
mania, which joined the EU in 2007, whilst the remaining CEECs joined at 2004, and, by 
2007, they had three years of EU membership—a period of major adjustments when much 
of the output gains might have been made. Slovakia also experienced increases compara-
ble in relative terms to that of Bulgaria. Much of this family farms output increase in Slo-
vakia has been probably due to rebalancing between the two sectors since, over the period 
under consideration, the average output in the non-family farms has reduced dramati-
cally. 
In summary, the differences in the initial conditions, the farms structures emerging 
from the post-communist land reforms, and the adjustments to the CAP have brought 
about quite a diverse picture concerning the changes in output in the family farms com-
pared to the general farm structure in each NMS. The a priori expected dynamics of pos-
itive output growth in family farms and negative in the non-family sector has only mate-
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rialised in Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia. The second group includes countries which rec-
orded positive growth in both types of farm organisation, i.e., Bulgaria and Lithuania. The 
third group experienced contraction in both sectors—Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, and Slo-
venia, although the magnitude of the decrease in relative terms in non-family output in 
Czechia has been negligible. Poland has recorded a decrease in family farms output and 
increase in non-family but both by less than 10%. 
5. Decomposition Results 
Our estimated decomposition of the output changes is presented in Table 5. Since the 
regression model used to construct these decompositions is based on a translog specifica-
tion, the dependent variable is not output itself but its natural logarithm. If we denote 




). Therefore, the estimated decomposition is applied to the relative change in 
output. This has two useful consequences. First, the sign of the changes can be interpreted 
in the usual way (positive sign denoting increase and negative one—decrease), and, sec-
ond, since these are relative changes, they can be directly compared across countries. For 
completeness the raw regressions for 2007 and 2015 used to construct the above decom-
position (after they are simultaneously bootstrapped), which are presented in Appendix 
B. 
Almost all countries show that the model coefficients, i.e., technological change, pro-
vide a significant effect. In simple terms, this demonstrates a shift in the family farms pro-
duction function, with the exception of only Lithuania and Slovakia, where the corre-
sponding technological change effects are not statistically significant. Consequently, it ap-
pears that across the board the production technology shift has been a driving force of the 
structural change in the CEECs family farms. However, a closer look at the sign, i.e., the 
direction of technological change effects, reveals differences between countries. While this 
effect is positive for the countries that acceded to the EU in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania, 
it is positive for only one of the countries that joined in 2004, namely Latvia. For all other 
seven NMS that joined in 2004, the technological changes either had a negative effect on 
family farms output or, as in the case of Lithuania and Slovakia, no significant effect. This 
suggests the possibility of a rapid technical change in family farms in the early years of 
EU accession, followed by slowing down when they are overtaken by the rest of the agri-
cultural sector. This is an issue that deserves more detailed consideration in future re-
search investigating a longer time period. 
Table 5. Estimated decomposition of output changes. 
 Endowments SE 
Technological 
Change 
SE Interaction SE Total 
Bulgaria 0.039 0.065 0.173 0.050 0.009 0.042 0.221 
Czechia −0.006 0.050 −0.147 0.029 0.034 0.026 −0.119 
Estonia 0.008 0.130 −0.173 0.048 0.023 0.080 −0.141 
Hungary 0.118 0.050 −0.139 0.033 0.008 0.019 −0.013 
Lithuania 0.129 0.056 0.006 0.026 0.017 0.017 0.152 
Latvia −0.065 0.058 0.164 0.026 0.007 0.022 0.105 
Poland 0.108 0.011 −0.157 0.008 0.009 0.006 −0.040 
Romania 0.258 0.081 0.171 0.072 −0.039 0.072 0.391 
Slovakia −0.063 0.120 −0.028 0.073 −0.114 0.075 −0.204 
Slovenia 0.156 0.071 0.090 0.042 −0.066 0.061 0.179 
Significant components in bold. 
The change in endowments is also an important contributor in five out of the ten 
countries, while the interaction of endowment and technological change is a significant 
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driver of the changes in only two countries. The effect of endowments is mostly positive, 
with the only exception being Slovenia. This suggests that the family farming sector grows 
by accumulating productive resources. However, this growth has not always materialised 
in family farms output. In Bulgaria, Czechia, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovakia, this accumu-
lation of productive resources has not been translated in output growth. What this means 
is not that such growth has not taken place. Indeed, a closer look at the changes in endow-
ments presented in Appendix A reveals that the family sector has increased its endow-
ments, particularly capital and land. This growth has not, however, for the aforemen-
tioned countries, been translated into output growth. 
If we take the relative share of the technological shift in the explained changes, then, 
in four countries (Bulgaria, Czechia, Latvia, and Estonia), it is the only significant change, 
thus accounting for all of the changes in family farms output. Romania and Slovenia show 
both endowments and technological change effects, with endowment accounting for 
about 60% of the changes. Note, however, that the underlying dynamics in these two 
countries is quite different—growth of family farming in Romania and contraction in Slo-
venia. Poland and Hungary, which are two countries which started their transition earlier 
than the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and required less adjustments of farm struc-
tures to a market economy, show a very different de-compositional pattern. In both coun-
tries, the changes in endowments increase the family farms output. However, this increase 
is more than offset by productivity losses due to technological change, hence resulting in 
contraction of the output of the family farming sector. This may suggest that, while, in the 
early stages of transition (exemplified here by Bulgaria and Romania), the family sector 
benefits from technological change, later in transition, as in Hungary and Poland, it faces 
technological constraints and the accumulation of resources becomes its main source of 
growth. It may be that such resource accumulation is a precursor necessary to initiate a 
next cycle of technological gains, but this is a process that might need longer time to ma-
terialise. 
Finally, the only driver of family farming changes in Slovakia is the interaction be-
tween endowments and technological changes, while, in Lithuania, endowments account 
for most of the changes with a small contribution from the interaction. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper studied the sources of agricultural output changes in family farms in the 
CEECs. We have discovered several commonalities in the development of the family 
farming in these countries but also distinct differences. While some of these differences 
may be attributed to different initial conditions, taking into account the differences in the 
history of transition and post-communist reforms, the timing of accession to the EU allows 
us to group these changes into several underlying trends. In particular, our analysis sug-
gests that the early stages of EU accession appear to benefit family farms in terms of ac-
celerated technological change, which becomes the main source of productivity gains. 
Later on, the productivity gains generated by the technological change disappear and 
even reverse, indicating that family farming reaches growth constraints. However, as the 
agricultural economy further develops, taking advantage of the support measures of the 
EU CAP, the endowment effect appears, and growth due to the accumulation of produc-
tive resources takes place. This growth may start to bridge the gap due to the lack of tech-
nological advancement, and it is not inconceivable to expect that it may lead to a next 
stage of output growth when these endowments effects would facilitate a new wave of 
technological change. 
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Appendix A. Summary Statistics 













Bulgaria capital 7297 10,235 40% 9667 22,089 129% 
 labour 2.90 2.59 −11% 4.56 3.98 −13% 
 land 6.84 8.14 19% 24.55 37.75 54% 
 ic 8858 7602 −14% 19,606 31,851 62% 
Czech Re-
public 
capital 91,668 101,569 11% 1,315,087 718,893 −45% 
 labour 2.27 2.31 2% 25.76 17.49 −32% 
 land 62.40 55.42 −11% 654.88 559.38 −15% 
 ic 40,752 41,982 3% 620,832 684,973 10% 
Estonia capital 56,951 60,313 6% 159,742 83,904 −47% 
 labour 2.08 1.72 −17% 5.36 1.88 −65% 
 land 101.85 79.61 −22% 146.72 91.97 −37% 
 ic 25,025 31,452 26% 86,297 60,716 −30% 
Hungary capital 55,953 72,807 30% 35,672 28,608 −20% 
 labour 2.20 2.53 15% 1.76 1.60 −9% 
 land 54.31 47.73 −12% 53.94 37.45 −31% 
 ic 47,333 63,381 34% 52,098 51,493 −1% 
Lithuania capital 44,162 43,689 −1% 127,487 188,256 48% 
 labour 2.04 2.01 −1% 4.39 4.39 0% 
 land 61.33 65.21 6% 159.44 213.72 34% 
 ic 37,270 47,968 29% 130,831 211,201 61% 
Latvia capital 33,215 35,540 7% 116,841 93,066 −20% 
 labour 2.29 1.92 −16% 7.56 3.83 −49% 
 land 76.34 76.69 0% 185.06 155.93 −16% 
 ic 33,786 30,767 −9% 130,183 98,262 −25% 
Poland capital 65,553 82,291 26% 38,643 50,836 32% 
 labour 1.93 1.85 −4% 1.30 1.43 9% 
 land 20.80 25.18 21% 20.45 29.29 43% 
 ic 16,855 19,574 16% 13,212 19,094 45% 
Romania capital 8325 19,632 136% 65,223 30,108 −54% 
 labour 2.43 1.79 −26% 8.53 1.38 −84% 
 land 6.25 12.30 97% 57.07 20.23 −65% 
 ic 3655 4527 24% 50,389 6170 −88% 
Slovakia capital 31,359 47,654 52% 1,648,759 273,442 −83% 
 labour 3.31 2.67 −19% 40.47 12.28 −70% 
 land 140.09 144.89 3% 1,166.46 615.34 −47% 
 ic 54,862 79,165 44% 689,759 400,049 −42% 
Slovenia capital 89,070 85,254 −4% 32,346 38,279 18% 
 labour 2.10 1.69 −19% 0.70 0.65 −7% 
 land 15.79 11.99 −24% 7.96 7.43 −7% 
 ic 12,893 19,084 48% 3656 8641 136% 
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Appendix B. Individual Regressions for Base and Reference Year per Country (Varia-
bles in Logarithms) 
Table A2. Bulgaria 2007. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 6.096 0.402 15.166 0.000 
capital −0.050 0.049 −1.013 0.311 
labour 1.275 0.197 6.486 0.000 
land 0.320 0.084 3.799 0.000 
ic −0.007 0.062 −0.113 0.910 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.039 0.005 7.292 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.142 0.076 1.874 0.061 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.078 0.013 5.997 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.065 0.007 8.983 0.000 
capital:labour −0.003 0.014 −0.187 0.851 
capital:land −0.010 0.007 −1.527 0.127 
capital:ic −0.013 0.005 −2.456 0.014 
labour:land −0.061 0.019 −3.250 0.001 
labour:ic −0.076 0.024 −3.191 0.001 
land:ic −0.021 0.010 −2.221 0.027 
Table A3. Bulgaria 2015. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 7.139 0.331 21.538 0.000 
capital −0.049 0.046 −1.073 0.283 
labour 1.305 0.196 6.645 0.000 
land 0.401 0.059 6.845 0.000 
ic −0.147 0.047 −3.107 0.002 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.048 0.005 9.275 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.121 0.083 1.461 0.144 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.152 0.014 10.994 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.055 0.005 11.583 0.000 
capital:labour −0.064 0.021 −3.048 0.002 
capital:land −0.021 0.006 −3.563 0.000 
capital:ic −0.011 0.005 −2.242 0.025 
labour:land −0.103 0.018 −5.803 0.000 
labour:ic 0.010 0.018 0.559 0.576 
land:ic −0.029 0.006 −5.029 0.000 
Table A4. Czech Republic 2007. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 13.419 1.116 12.028 0.000 
capital −0.164 0.104 −1.567 0.118 
labour 1.531 0.489 3.133 0.002 
land 0.892 0.181 4.919 0.000 
ic −1.309 0.250 −5.234 0.000 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.027 0.007 3.709 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) −0.052 0.096 −0.541 0.589 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.128 0.013 9.616 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.179 0.031 5.830 0.000 
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capital:labour 0.026 0.035 0.753 0.452 
capital:land −0.034 0.013 −2.726 0.007 
capital:ic 0.009 0.010 0.886 0.376 
labour:land −0.025 0.029 −0.882 0.378 
labour:ic −0.119 0.046 −2.591 0.010 
land:ic −0.067 0.016 −4.099 0.000 
Table A5. Czech republic 2015. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 11.365 1.936 5.871 0.000 
capital −0.545 0.225 −2.426 0.016 
labour 2.636 0.557 4.729 0.000 
land 0.610 0.219 2.783 0.006 
ic −0.473 0.224 −2.115 0.035 
I(0.5 * capital^2) −0.001 0.020 −0.036 0.971 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.304 0.114 2.653 0.008 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.197 0.019 10.493 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.043 0.012 3.723 0.000 
capital:labour −0.059 0.047 −1.249 0.212 
capital:land −0.009 0.020 −0.474 0.636 
capital:ic 0.066 0.025 2.709 0.007 
labour:land −0.107 0.034 −3.186 0.002 
labour:ic −0.113 0.040 −2.856 0.004 
land:ic −0.083 0.017 −4.913 0.000 
Table A6. Estonia 2007. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 8.458 0.649 13.037 0.000 
capital −0.225 0.082 −2.731 0.007 
labour 1.351 0.440 3.072 0.002 
land −0.418 0.250 −1.671 0.096 
ic −0.077 0.079 −0.968 0.334 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.021 0.009 2.358 0.019 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.191 0.150 1.273 0.204 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.015 0.036 0.428 0.669 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.064 0.015 4.420 0.000 
capital:labour 0.061 0.055 1.110 0.268 
capital:land 0.061 0.029 2.108 0.036 
capital:ic −0.005 0.007 −0.627 0.531 
labour:land −0.184 0.085 −2.156 0.032 
labour:ic −0.105 0.055 −1.914 0.056 
land:ic −0.001 0.032 −0.032 0.974 
Table A7. Estonia 2015. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 2.477 3.556 0.696 0.487 
capital −0.035 0.449 −0.078 0.938 
labour 1.387 1.263 1.098 0.273 
land −1.090 0.693 −1.572 0.117 
ic 1.162 0.738 1.573 0.117 
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I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.085 0.049 1.713 0.088 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.202 0.258 0.783 0.435 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.111 0.083 1.337 0.183 
I(0.5 * ic^2) −0.062 0.084 −0.741 0.460 
capital:labour 0.129 0.139 0.931 0.353 
capital:land −0.014 0.060 −0.239 0.811 
capital:ic −0.055 0.041 −1.345 0.180 
labour:land −0.244 0.144 −1.700 0.091 
labour:ic −0.136 0.162 −0.835 0.405 
land:ic 0.111 0.082 1.352 0.178 
Table A8. Hungary 2007 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 9.300 1.254 7.417 0.000 
capital 0.026 0.114 0.225 0.822 
labour 2.155 0.564 3.821 0.000 
land 0.267 0.196 1.366 0.172 
ic −0.676 0.274 −2.471 0.014 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.051 0.008 6.494 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.192 0.136 1.412 0.158 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.158 0.020 8.099 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.154 0.035 4.410 0.000 
capital:labour −0.107 0.042 −2.565 0.011 
capital:land −0.015 0.014 −1.089 0.276 
capital:ic −0.025 0.014 −1.819 0.069 
labour:land −0.011 0.036 −0.319 0.750 
labour:ic −0.070 0.058 −1.210 0.227 
land:ic −0.052 0.020 −2.621 0.009 
Table A9. Hungary 2015. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 8.171 1.840 4.441 0.000 
capital 0.012 0.188 0.063 0.950 
labour 1.890 0.500 3.779 0.000 
land 0.406 0.167 2.430 0.015 
ic −0.379 0.270 −1.403 0.161 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.046 0.008 5.639 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.207 0.116 1.778 0.076 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.160 0.016 10.035 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.095 0.027 3.601 0.000 
capital:labour −0.054 0.035 −1.557 0.120 
capital:land −0.020 0.012 −1.667 0.096 
capital:ic −0.016 0.018 −0.865 0.387 
labour:land −0.100 0.029 −3.432 0.001 
labour:ic −0.055 0.042 −1.308 0.191 
land:ic −0.048 0.015 −3.152 0.002 
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Table A10. Latvia 2007. 
 Estimate SE T statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 3.554 1.070 3.321 0.001 
capital 0.285 0.142 1.997 0.046 
labour 0.355 0.329 1.077 0.282 
land 0.090 0.213 0.421 0.674 
ic 0.211 0.146 1.441 0.150 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.032 0.006 4.954 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.112 0.082 1.371 0.171 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.071 0.032 2.228 0.026 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.084 0.012 7.294 0.000 
capital:labour 0.067 0.028 2.397 0.017 
capital:land 0.012 0.020 0.593 0.553 
capital:ic −0.051 0.019 −2.700 0.007 
labour:land −0.154 0.036 −4.314 0.000 
labour:ic −0.024 0.043 −0.562 0.574 
land:ic −0.015 0.021 −0.719 0.472 
Table A11. Latvia 2015. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 7.441 0.604 12.320 0.000 
capital −0.092 0.096 −0.951 0.342 
labour 0.904 0.292 3.096 0.002 
land 0.683 0.198 3.446 0.001 
ic −0.310 0.088 −3.529 0.000 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.031 0.006 5.098 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.185 0.081 2.287 0.022 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.310 0.040 7.723 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.101 0.012 8.128 0.000 
capital:labour −0.014 0.027 −0.518 0.605 
capital:land −0.032 0.015 −2.225 0.026 
capital:ic 0.009 0.013 0.696 0.487 
labour:land −0.109 0.040 −2.732 0.006 
labour:ic −0.012 0.033 −0.376 0.707 
land:ic −0.118 0.026 −4.476 0.000 
Table A12. Lithuania 2007. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 7.099 1.508 4.709 0.000 
capital 0.393 0.210 1.877 0.061 
labour 1.031 0.460 2.242 0.025 
land 0.074 0.313 0.235 0.814 
ic −0.590 0.321 −1.837 0.067 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.028 0.009 3.196 0.001 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.085 0.110 0.774 0.439 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.144 0.037 3.901 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.198 0.049 4.046 0.000 
capital:labour 0.103 0.040 2.559 0.011 
capital:land 0.045 0.025 1.775 0.076 
capital:ic −0.071 0.029 −2.466 0.014 
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labour:land −0.187 0.054 −3.449 0.001 
labour:ic −0.104 0.057 −1.832 0.067 
land:ic −0.065 0.035 −1.864 0.063 
Table A13. Lithuania 2015. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 10.850 1.496 7.254 0.000 
capital −0.189 0.151 −1.254 0.210 
labour 2.309 0.534 4.323 0.000 
land 0.355 0.293 1.211 0.226 
ic −0.876 0.340 −2.576 0.010 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.016 0.006 2.624 0.009 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.116 0.108 1.074 0.283 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.143 0.025 5.738 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.140 0.046 3.055 0.002 
capital:labour 0.090 0.036 2.496 0.013 
capital:land 0.006 0.019 0.321 0.748 
capital:ic 0.009 0.020 0.434 0.664 
labour:land −0.132 0.060 −2.212 0.027 
labour:ic −0.218 0.066 −3.333 0.001 
land:ic −0.047 0.031 −1.527 0.127 
Table A14. Poland 2007. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 9.756 0.448 21.797 0.000 
capital −0.612 0.055 −11.119 0.000 
labour 2.834 0.148 19.175 0.000 
land 0.803 0.063 12.797 0.000 
ic −0.544 0.058 −9.306 0.000 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.096 0.005 19.116 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.260 0.030 8.723 0.000 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.155 0.005 29.094 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.097 0.003 36.599 0.000 
capital:labour −0.094 0.015 −6.421 0.000 
capital:land −0.072 0.006 −11.562 0.000 
capital:ic 0.019 0.006 3.450 0.001 
labour:land −0.018 0.010 −1.795 0.073 
labour:ic −0.158 0.012 −12.674 0.000 
land:ic −0.031 0.004 −7.359 0.000 
Table A15. Poland 2015. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 9.168 0.390 23.489 0.000 
capital −0.472 0.043 −10.910 0.000 
labour 1.890 0.159 11.853 0.000 
land 0.369 0.069 5.323 0.000 
ic −0.339 0.052 −6.481 0.000 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.070 0.003 20.383 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.273 0.038 7.190 0.000 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.196 0.008 23.689 0.000 
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I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.086 0.002 36.457 0.000 
capital:labour −0.028 0.016 −1.791 0.073 
capital:land −0.019 0.007 −2.714 0.007 
capital:ic 0.009 0.005 1.645 0.100 
labour:land −0.131 0.015 −8.880 0.000 
labour:ic −0.095 0.012 −7.902 0.000 
land:ic −0.048 0.005 −9.917 0.000 
Table A16. Romania 2007. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 7.774 0.504 15.428 0.000 
capital −0.357 0.095 −3.770 0.000 
labour 0.524 0.279 1.876 0.061 
land 0.774 0.128 6.057 0.000 
ic 0.019 0.106 0.179 0.858 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.065 0.011 6.015 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.264 0.118 2.241 0.025 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.155 0.023 6.873 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.061 0.020 3.021 0.003 
capital:labour 0.113 0.041 2.760 0.006 
capital:land −0.048 0.017 −2.891 0.004 
capital:ic −0.013 0.013 −1.029 0.304 
labour:land −0.016 0.032 −0.519 0.604 
labour:ic −0.168 0.035 −4.746 0.000 
land:ic −0.040 0.015 −2.672 0.008 
Table A18. Romania 2015. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 7.360 0.295 24.989 0.000 
capital −0.156 0.044 −3.535 0.000 
labour 0.620 0.264 2.351 0.019 
land 0.838 0.077 10.830 0.000 
ic −0.220 0.048 −4.573 0.000 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.033 0.006 5.411 0.000 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.128 0.132 0.975 0.330 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.134 0.010 12.844 0.000 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.041 0.004 9.782 0.000 
capital:labour 0.061 0.031 1.931 0.054 
capital:land −0.039 0.007 −5.445 0.000 
capital:ic 0.016 0.005 3.265 0.001 
labour:land −0.187 0.028 −6.568 0.000 
labour:ic −0.039 0.023 −1.679 0.093 
land:ic −0.032 0.005 −5.849 0.000 
Table A19. Slovakia 2007. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 4.237 2.577 1.644 0.102 
capital 0.457 0.185 2.470 0.014 
labour −0.137 0.747 −0.184 0.854 
land −0.490 0.549 −0.892 0.373 
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ic 0.537 0.632 0.851 0.396 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.032 0.010 3.123 0.002 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.475 0.161 2.948 0.004 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.384 0.120 3.211 0.002 
I(0.5 * ic^2) −0.026 0.089 −0.294 0.769 
capital:labour −0.015 0.033 −0.462 0.645 
capital:land −0.092 0.041 −2.237 0.026 
capital:ic −0.023 0.026 −0.887 0.376 
labour:land −0.301 0.093 −3.258 0.001 
labour:ic 0.121 0.091 1.321 0.188 
land:ic 0.029 0.078 0.367 0.714 
Table A20. Slovakia 2015. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 9.736 3.581 2.719 0.007 
capital −0.003 0.189 −0.017 0.986 
labour 1.446 0.893 1.619 0.107 
land −0.473 0.795 −0.595 0.552 
ic −0.109 0.709 −0.153 0.879 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.007 0.010 0.685 0.494 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.464 0.162 2.873 0.005 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.135 0.065 2.074 0.039 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.024 0.092 0.261 0.794 
capital:labour 0.017 0.037 0.449 0.654 
capital:land 0.039 0.041 0.958 0.339 
capital:ic −0.021 0.023 −0.896 0.371 
labour:land −0.425 0.102 −4.156 0.000 
labour:ic 0.018 0.092 0.193 0.848 
land:ic 0.041 0.083 0.494 0.622 
Table A21. Slovenia 2007. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 12.939 1.697 7.624 0.000 
capital −0.719 0.293 −2.456 0.014 
labour 1.341 0.643 2.087 0.037 
land 0.967 0.519 1.863 0.063 
ic −0.890 0.222 −4.016 0.000 
I(0.5 * capital^2) 0.070 0.035 1.990 0.047 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.069 0.194 0.353 0.724 
I(0.5 * land^2) −0.188 0.096 −1.966 0.050 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.120 0.012 9.734 0.000 
capital:labour −0.174 0.071 −2.461 0.014 
capital:land 0.036 0.057 0.635 0.526 
capital:ic 0.021 0.024 0.855 0.393 
labour:land 0.104 0.096 1.077 0.282 
labour:ic 0.076 0.034 2.192 0.029 
land:ic −0.060 0.033 −1.834 0.067 
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Table A22. Slovenia 2015. 
 Estimate SE T Statistic p-Value 
(Intercept) 14.087 2.347 6.003 0.000 
capital −0.711 0.349 −2.038 0.042 
labour 3.297 0.897 3.676 0.000 
land 0.961 0.575 1.672 0.095 
ic −1.211 0.343 −3.527 0.000 
I(0.5 * capital^2) −0.003 0.038 −0.068 0.946 
I(0.5 * labour^2) 0.180 0.156 1.154 0.249 
I(0.5 * land^2) 0.058 0.083 0.694 0.488 
I(0.5 * ic^2) 0.150 0.043 3.512 0.000 
capital:labour −0.071 0.079 −0.900 0.368 
capital:land 0.101 0.054 1.863 0.063 
capital:ic 0.076 0.035 2.154 0.032 
labour:land 0.128 0.104 1.239 0.216 
labour:ic −0.237 0.077 −3.066 0.002 
land:ic −0.213 0.057 −3.714 0.000 
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